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An Overview of the Performance and 
Potential of Public Works Programmes 
in South Africa 
 
 
 
Executive Summary  
 
The South African economy is unable to deliver employment for a growing 
number of would-be workers, especially among the unskilled. There is a need for 
state intervention to address this failure, and public works have been identified 
in the national policy discourse as a central policy response, to address both the 
problem of unemployment, and also a range of social development and 
economic objectives. This paper provides a critical review of the evidence base 
available to policy makers on public works, and an assessment of the 
performance of public works in South Africa since 1996, in response to the 
question of whether public works can offer a significant response to the South 
African employment crisis. 
 
With the data currently available it is not possible to show that the anticipated 
broader benefits of public works programmes in terms of increased livelihoods, 
reduced poverty, the creation of sustainable employment, community 
empowerment, local multipliers, or growth as outlined in the policy rhetoric, 
have been achieved. It is only possible to assess performance in terms of the 
scale of employment created. By this criterion, success has been limited. The 
Community Based Public Works Programme, the major national employment 
creation instrument, created between 13,000 and 33,000 jobs per annum 
between 1996 and 2001, representing an estimated 1.5 million to 4.5 million 
workdays per annum, or 0.2 to 0.5% of total unemployed labour days. The scale 
of employment creation performance has been limited, due to i) the scale of 
budgetary allocations, (less than one percent of the annual social security and 
welfare budget), and ii) institutional constraints, relating to programme 
conceptualisation and design, and project management capacity, in both the 
public and private sectors. The multiplicity of programme objectives has also 
contributed to a lack of focus which has reduced the amount of employment 
generated. 
 
In this paper simple models are used to estimate the impact and fiscal feasibility 
of ‘expanded’ public works programmes using the limited data available. The 
employment creation potential of a R1.2 billion investment in labour intensive 
 2
construction over three-years is found to represent a maximum of 0.5% of 
unemployed workdays per annum. The cost to the fiscus of an expanded public 
works programme able to offer part time employment to a significant number of 
workers (3.2 million) is found to be between R17 and R28 billion per annum.  
 
Irrespective of the fiscal feasibility of this level of expenditure, such a 
programme is unlikely to meet the wider set of sustainable social development 
and economic objectives set out in the policy discourse, unless a series of 
institutional issues relating to project design and implementation are resolved. 
The limited duration of employment offered under public works may mean that 
the wage transfer functions as a short term income shock, which is consumed, 
rather than leading to sustained benefits or livelihoods improvements for 
participants, a problem which is compounded by lack of access to microfinance. 
Targeting and rationing problems may be leading to a sub-optimal allocation of 
employment for the intended beneficiary groups, and the selection of 
appropriate assets for construction and rehabilitation is hindered by the lack of 
strategic development plans at local level. Limited project management and 
social development capacity in the public and private sectors is also serving to 
constrain performance.  
 
Many workers return to the unemployed labour pool after completing work in 
short term public works projects, rather than being absorbed into the labour 
market. The implementation of multiple short term projects may therefore serve 
only to churn the unemployed, replacing one cohort of the unemployed with 
another in short term employment projects, and removing them temporarily 
from the pool of unemployed labour, rather than addressing either the 
underlying problem of unemployment, or having a significant or sustained 
impact on livelihoods. 
 
In the light of this analysis it is concluded that while public works programmes 
are a valid component of a social protection policy, an expanded public works 
programme sui generis is unlikely to have a significant impact on the problems 
of poverty and labour market access, or their associate, growth, unless the 
proportion of government expenditure allocated to the programme is 
substantially increased, and the associated institutional constraints are 
addressed. 
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1.  Introduction  
  
The South African economy is unable to deliver employment for a growing 
number of would-be workers, especially among the unskilled, and there is a 
need for state intervention to address this failure and its consequences. The 
dominant economic paradigm in South Africa places ideological constraints on 
the range of policy options under consideration, leading to the favouring of 
public works programmes over other solutions such as direct transfers (e.g. a 
basic income grant). Given this context, it is critical to assess the potential of 
public works, and their adequacy as an instrument for addressing the problems 
of poverty and unemployment. This paper provides a critical review of the 
evidence base available to policy makers on Public Works, and an assessment of 
the performance of public works in South Africa since 1996, in response to the 
question of whether public works can offer a significant response to the South 
African employment crisis. 
 
 
1.1 Trends in Unemployment  
 
Structural unemployment and poverty are persistent and growing problems in 
contemporary South Africa. Unemployment continues to rise, standing at 4.8 
million in September 2002, or 30.5% by the official definition, (compared to a 
broad rate of 41.8%). Lewis (2001) has estimated that even in the most positive 
growth scenario, after ten years with projected GDP growth of between 4 and 
5% per annum, broad unemployment among the semi and unskilled would not 
fall significantly below 30 per cent (2001: 55). The central challenge is clear; the 
structure of the South African economy is such that unemployment will not be 
significantly reduced in the coming decades without major state intervention. 
This paper focuses on the issue of state intervention to promote employment 
creation through public works and labour intensification programmes. 
 
Whether conceptualised as a public good,1 as a requisite for enhanced growth 
and investment from a purely functional macroeconomic perspective, or as an 
essentially moral imperative sui generis, there is a need to promote increased 
access to employment, particularly in the light of the strength of the link 
between unemployment and poverty in South Africa.2 
 
                                                 
1Reducing the negative externalities associated with extreme poverty and inequality (Black et 
al, 1999: 50) 
2 This linkage is attested by Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001) and is largely due to the high 
reliance on wage income and the underdevelopment of the informal and subsistence sectors 
in South Africa, compared to other developing countries. 
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1.2 Assumptions Underlying Public Works  
Programme Impact 
 
In theory public works programmes achieve social development and economic 
objectives by creating employment through the creation of infrastructure, 
providing services or improving access to them, stimulating informal and formal 
sector economic activity and bringing resources into decapitalised areas. 
Potentially then, public works are an ideal instrument for deploying in the 
context of the South Africa of the 21st century, and consequently they have 
enjoyed considerable policy prominence since 1994. Public works programmes 
have been ascribed increasingly ambitious objectives in recent years, in terms of 
both scale and range of impacts. However, economic analysis to date, both in 
South Africa and internationally has focused almost exclusively on the 
evaluation of public works programmes in terms of the efficiency of transfers 
under public works programmes, rather than assessing the efficacy of the 
transfers in terms of direct or indirect microeconomic impact on participating 
households, and the ability of such programmes to achieve the anticipated 
impacts in the social, economic and labour market spheres (see for example 
Haddad & Adato, 2002).  
 
Likewise there is little evidence to confirm the assumed nexus between the poor 
and the public works programmes. There is frequently an assumption that if 
wages are correctly set, the transfer will reach the poor, despite the fact that 
there is little analysis exploring targeting efficiency in terms of whether 
programme participants are the poorest, or even the poor. Equally, the non-wage 
benefits accruing to the poor as a result of the assets created under the 
programme, and improved labour market access as a result of experience and 
training received in public works programmes, are often assumed, rather than 
empirically attested.  
 
Assumptions regarding the potential impact of public works programmes risk 
undermining evidence based and realistic policy making, and the development 
of distorted policy objectives and expectations related to public works 
programming. This paper explores the reality of public works programmes in 
South Africa, in terms of the scale of job creation to date, the fiscal implications 
of a large scale ‘extended’ programme, and the potential of such a programme to 
absorb unemployment. It then goes on to discuss some of the key policy and 
implementational issues which this debate provokes, with particular reference to 
the need for appropriate institutions and social development considerations if 
public works are to have a sustained and large scale impact on livelihoods. 
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2. The Economic and Policy Rationale for 
Public Works Programmes  
 
Bassi and Ashenfelter (1997) have identified three primary economic rationales 
for government intervention in the labour market; i) the reduction of frictional 
unemployment, ii) the reduction of cyclical unemployment which would operate 
on and off in response to fluctuations in the unemployment rate, and iii) the 
alleviation of structural unemployment which is involuntary and persists over 
the course of the business cycle. In the case of South Africa it is clearly the latter 
which is the core rationale for intervention. However in South Africa public 
works programme objectives also include a range of social development 
objectives which represent a response to the distortions resulting from apartheid 
labour market policies (and related policies including education, resource 
distribution etc). The assertion is frequently made that public works programmes 
will promote livelihoods by enhancing labour market access, reducing poverty 
and contributing to economic growth. 
 
The heavy reliance placed on public works to deliver significant responses to the 
critical challenges of poverty, unemployment and growth in the current South 
African anti-poverty and employment policy discourse invites an exploration of 
the existing evidence base, in order to inform a realistic assessment of their 
potential performance in relation to these ambitious targets. The evidence 
available in South Africa and internationally suggests that in and of themselves, 
public works programmes do not necessarily draw participants into the labour 
market, but offer a temporary employment sojourn; they do not necessarily 
move participants out of poverty, but offer a temporary respite, reducing the 
depth of poverty during the period of employment, and they do not offer 
sustainable livelihood improvements without a range of complementary social 
development interventions. Furthermore it would be incorrect to assume that 
assets created under public works schemes contribute directly or indirectly to 
growth and poverty reduction at either local or national levels, unless the assets 
created or maintained through public works are strategically selected for their 
benefits to the poor and/or the wider economy, and their construction is given 
adequate technical management to ensure they are of acceptable and sustainable 
quality. Moreover the performance of public works programmes in terms of 
their various social and economic objectives is highly contingent on the 
institutional context in which they are executed, and the social development 
process in which they are embedded. Without adequacy in either the institutional 
or social development context it is unlikely that public works programmes will 
meet the objectives set out above. 
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This paper constitutes a review of some of the evidence for public works 
programming in South Africa. Prior to an examination of the key determinants 
of public works performance in relation to poverty reduction and livelihoods 
promotion, the objectives of the national public works programme are reviewed, 
the scale of current operation of the National Community Based Public Works 
Programme (CBPWP) examined, the likely employment impact of an 
investment of R1.2billion in labour intensive public works appraised (as 
outlined in the 2003 National Budget), and the fiscal implications of an 
‘extended’ programme modelled.  
 
 
3. The Objectives of Public Works 
Programmes in South Africa  
 
The clarification and prioritisation of the objectives of a public works 
programme is critical for successful implementation. These vary according to a 
range of factors related to the nature of the labour market crisis the programme 
is designed to alleviate (chronic or acute), the intended beneficiary population 
(universal or targeted), the timescale of the intervention (long or short term).3 
All public works programmes however have at their core the joint objectives of 
poverty alleviation and/or poverty reduction, and asset creation, although the 
weighting of these components varies according to policy priorities. At their 
simplest public works programmes alleviate poverty through a transfer to 
increase household income. This benefits the household in two ways; through 
the transfer itself, and through the stabilisation effect it induces. Generally this 
transfer does not move participants out of poverty, but relieves poverty by 
enabling household consumption smoothing, reducing vulnerability to stochastic 
shocks, and diminishing the size of the poverty gap. 4  Even when transfer 
benefits are small, income stabilisation can pre-empt acute distress, and in such 
cases the insurance or ‘risk benefit’ function of a transfer may be as important as 
its transfer function. 5  Such poverty alleviation oriented programmes are the 
simplest to manage, creating jobs and offering a financial transfer in return. 
Poverty reduction programmes are more complex, typically also including 
micro-finance and/or training components in order to address sustainable 
livelihoods issues. Public works programmes are not only driven by poverty 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of the range of key factors influencing public works design see McCord, 
2002: 25. 
4 The Malawi Social Action Fund Public Works programme is a current example of a simple 
poverty alleviating public works programme which reduces the intensity of the poverty of 
participants. 
5 Dev (1995) argues that for the large scale Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme in 
India, the risk benefit is of greater significance in promoting household welfare than the value 
of the transfer itself.  
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objectives however, they also address asset creation and maintenance, and differ 
critically from simple welfare initiatives in this respect. In theory public works 
programmes match unmet demand for infrastructure creation with excess labour 
supply, a consideration that is particularly relevant in the South African context 
given the inequitable distribution of infrastructure under the previous 
dispensation, and the political commitment to widespread asset provision 
(housing, rural road construction etc).  
 
The South African National Public Works Programme was originally 
conceptualised as an instrument for asset and employment creation, on the basis 
of a two pronged strategy; promoting a community based public works 
programme, and changing the rules governing the provision of infrastructure to 
increase labour intensity across all government departments with responsibility 
for infrastructural delivery, (Adato et al, 1999). The latter entailed ‘the 
systematic re-orientation of public sector approaches to infrastructure provision’ 
(NEF, 1994), and was supported by the Construction Industry Development 
Programme, which was charged with the development and dissemination of best 
practice guidelines for labour-based construction in pursuit of the same goal. 
The merits of this approach were recognised in GEAR (1996), which argued that 
100,000 new jobs would be created each year through labour intensive responses 
to infrastructural development and service provision. However, successive 
policy shifts in the Department of Public Works reduced the relative priority of 
employment creation through the labour intensification of infrastructure 
provision, which has only recently been restated as a central policy objective 
(see for example the Growth and Development Summit, June 2003, and ANC 
lekgotla, July 2003). The Department of Public Works focused instead on more 
conventional public works programmes through the Community Based Public 
Works Programme.6  
 
The objectives of the National Public Works Programme set out by the NEF in 
1994, are highly complex and comprise; i) create, rehabilitate, and maintain 
physical assets that serve to meet the basic needs of poor communities and 
promote broader economic activity; ii) reduce unemployment through the 
creation of productive jobs; iii) educate and train those on the programme as a 
means of economic empowerment; iv) build the capacity of communities to 
manage their own affairs, strengthening local government and other community 
based institutions, and generating sustainable economic development. These 
four objectives can be divided into eight primary and three secondary objectives, 
                                                 
6  Rather than reorienting infrastructural investment throughout the administration, the 
Department of Public Works contribution to public works has been focused on the 
administration of the National Public Works Programme, which in 2000/1 represented only 
9% of its total budget. (Department of Public Works, 2001). 
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set out in figure 1. These objectives will be discussed in the light of programme 
design in section eight. 
 
Figure 1: National public works programme objectives 
 
Primary Secondary 
1. Create/ maintain infrastructure 1.1 Meet basic needs of poor 
communities 
1.2 Promote economic activity 
2. Reduce unemployment  
3. Create productive jobs  
4. Educate and train workers 4.1 Achieve economic empowerment 
5. Build community capacity  
6. Strengthen local government  
7. Strengthen community based  
institutions 
 
8. Generate sustainable economic 
development 
 
Source: NEF 1994a 
 
Additional functions such as community empowerment, capacity building and 
transformation have also been added to the public works concept in South 
Africa.7 In some instances this plurality of objectives has hindered progress on 
the primary job creation objective. This multiplicity of objectives led Adato and 
Haddad to conclude that ‘South Africa’s public works programmes have been 
among the most innovative in the world, with multiple objectives that include 
not only job creation, poverty reduction, and infrastructure development, but 
simultaneously job training and community capacity building’ (2002: 30). 
 
However, while this ambitious set of objectives gives the programme 
considerable development potential it also entails trade-offs in terms of 
employment creation. This is illustrated by the performance of the Community 
Based Public Works Programme which in 2000/1 created only 918 sustainable 
and 32,587 ‘non-sustainable’8 jobs at a cost of R349 million (Department of 
Public Works, 2001). The conceptualisation of public works programming as a 
transformational tool, rather than a tool to address the national employment 
                                                 
7 This range of objectives is included in the strategy of the National Programme for Public 
Works, Department of Public Works, 1996. 
8 The term ‘non-sustainable jobs’ has been used in order to differentiate between the two 
categories of employment generated under the Community Based Public Works Programme, 
which are recorded as ‘jobs’ and ‘sustainable jobs’ (see for example Department of Public 
Works, 2001) 
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crisis goes some way to explaining the poor performance and high cost9 of 
South African interventions to date.10 If public works programmes are given 
additional objectives related to the more diffuse and complex goal of 
transformation, the primary goal of job creation may be undermined, and the 
value of the intervention substantially reduced in terms of poverty alleviation 
and asset creation. 
 
 
4. The Scale of Public Works Interventions to 
Date 
 
The Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) is the primary 
national mechanism for job creation, although there are a range of other public 
works programmes currently being implemented in South Africa, most of which 
fall under the national public works programme, known as the Special Public 
Works Programme11 (SPWP). With the exception of the Department of Water 
Affairs’ Working for Water programme, which in 2002/3 created between 3 and 
4 million workdays, the other programmes under the SPWP are considerably 
smaller than the CBPWP, and hence this section of the paper focuses 
exclusively on the performance of the CBPWP as the main national instrument 
for employment creation. The performance of the CBPWP is measured in terms 
of the number of ‘jobs’ and ‘sustainable jobs’ created (Department of Public 
Works Annual Reports, 1997-2002). Use of the terms ‘jobs created’ and 
‘sustainable jobs created’ is however problematic as they have no common 
definition (see discussion in McCord, 2002)12, and the term ‘workdays created’ 
is preferred in the international literature as an alternative which provides a 
comparable indicator of performance. Since data on the number of workdays 
created each year by the CBPWP are not available13, estimated workdays have 
been calculated to provide indicative figures for the employment creation 
                                                 
9 The cost of public works programmes in South Africa is discussed in detail in Adato et al 
(1999) and McCord (2002). 
10 The former Deputy Director of the Department of Public Works explained the low number 
of jobs created, and high costs in terms of the fact that ‘For us [in South Africa]… it’s the 
issue of content as opposed to necessarily scale, because scale does not address the South 
African problem which is a transformational problem’ (quoted in Adato et al, 1999: 232).  
11 The following programmes constitute SPWPs under the Ministerial Determination of 2002; 
Community Based Public Works (CBPWP), Working for Water, Coastal Care, Sustainable 
Rural Development (DPLG), Landcare, Community Water and Sanitation, and Arts and 
Culture poverty relief projects. (Department of Labour, 2002a). 
12 The term job created does not give information on the duration or full/part time nature of 
employment created, and hence renders performance monitoring and comparison 
problematic. 
13 Interview with de Bruyn, National Poverty Allocation Programme Manager, South African 
National Treasury 2002. 
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performance of the programme. Assumptions were made regarding the number 
of workdays created per ‘job’ and ‘sustainable job’14, which yielded the results 
in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1: Employment generated by the CBPWP (1996/7 to 2001/2) 
 
Year 
Total number 
of jobs created 
 
Total number of 
sustainable jobs 
created 
Total number of 
workdays created 
(estimated) 
96/97 n/a n/a 1,430,00015 
97/98 13,000 n/a 1,560,000 
98/99 29,194 4,154 4,001,760 
99/00 15,665 342 1,920,840 
00/01 33,505 918 4,437,480 
01/02 25,124 527 3,078,120 
Source: Own calculations and Department of Public Works Annual Reports 1997 to 2002 
 
Table 1 indicates that there were considerable fluctuations in the performance of 
the CBPWP over the 1996 to 2002 period, with the total number of ‘jobs’ 
created ranging from 13,000 in 1996/7 to a maximum of 33,505 in 2000/1, and 
the number of ‘sustainable’ jobs fluctuating from a high of 4,154 in 1998/9 to 
only 342 in 1999/2000.16 These figures represent the creation of between 1.4 and 
4.4 million workdays per annum under the CBPWP during this period. 
 
In order to assess the significance of this level of job creation it is necessary to 
compare the scale of employment created under this programme with the scale 
of the unemployment problem. Table 2 indicates the incidence of official and 
expanded unemployment during the 1996 to 2001 period, during which time it 
has risen significantly. 
 
                                                 
14 These workdays are indicative only, as data on workdays created under the CBPWP and 
the average duration of employment is not available for this period. The figures are 
calculated on the assumption that a 'sustainable' job offers 12 months full time work, less 20 
days per annum holiday/public holiday, and a 'non-sustainable' job offers 6 months full time 
work, less 10 days per annum holiday/public holiday per annum. It is likely that this 
calculation will err on the side of overestimating the performance of the programme.  
15 This figure is based on actual rather than estimated workdays of workdays created, as 
reported in the Department of Public Works Annual Report, 1997.  
16 The expansion of employment creation in 2000/01 reflects the policy imperative to increase 
spending against budget in the programme during this year, following several years of 
significant underspending (Department of Public Works, 2001). 
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Table 2: Official and expanded unemployment 1996-2001 
 
Year Official Expanded 
1996 2,224,000 4,566,000 
1997 2,451,000 5,202,000 
1998 3,163,000 5,634,000 
1999 3,158,000 5,882,000 
2000 4,082,000 6,559,000 
2001 4,525,000 7,698,000 
Source:  Stats SA 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 
 
 
Table 3 illustrates CBPWP performance against unemployment, presenting the 
number of workdays created under the CBPWP as a percentage of the 
unemployment figures in Table 2 converted into workdays. It indicates that 
when examined in the context of unemployment over this period, the workdays 
created under the CBPWP represent between 0.23 and 0.48% of total official 
unemployment during 1996/7 and 2001/2, and 0.11 and 0.27% of broad 
unemployment. If the employment creation achievements of Working for Water 
and other major public works initiatives were added to these totals, the total 
percentage of unemployment accounted for by public works programmes would 
be unlikely to exceed 1% for 2002/3.17  This suggests that the scale of job 
creation over this period has been negligible in terms of the magnitude of 
current employment, and does not offer a significant response to the problem of 
mass unemployment.18  
 
                                                 
17 This estimate is based on figures from the CBPWP, Working for Water, the KwaZulu Natal 
Zibambele programme, and Budlender (2002). The Working for Water Programme created 
between 3 and 4 million workdays in 2002/3 while the Zibambele Programme created just 
over 1 million workdays in 2002/3.  
18 A similar level of employment absorption, between 0.65 and 1.25% was found by Adato et 
al in their study of public works programmes in the Western Cape between 1995 and 1997 
(Adato et al, 1999:  169). 
 12
Table 3: CBPWP performance in relation to unemployment, 1996 to 
2001 
 
Year 
Total 
workdays 
created 
(million) 
Total official
Unemployme
nt 
Workdays 
(million) 
Workdays 
created as % 
of total official 
unemploy-
ment 
Total broad 
Unemploy-
ment 
workdays 
(million) 
Workdays 
created as % 
of total broad 
unemploy- 
ment 
96/97 1.4 587 0.24 1,205 0.12 
97/98 1.6 647 0.24 1,373 0.11 
98/99 4.0 835 0.48 1,487 0.27 
99/00 1.9 834 0.23 1,553 0.12 
00/01 4.4 1,078 0.41 1,732 0.26 
01/02 3.1 1,195 0.26 2,032 0.15 
Source: Own calculations and Department of Public Works 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002 and 
Stats SA 2002 
 
 
A comparison with the performance of the Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MEGS) implemented in the state of Maharashtra in India since 1970 is 
instructive in reviewing the scale of South African job creation performance.19 
The MEGS was designed initially as a response to an acute problem, but 
subsequently offered employment on a cyclical basis for those facing chronic 
unemployment and underemployment, as a result of the structural composition 
of the rural Indian economy. The objective of the programme was to ‘sustain 
household welfare in the short run, through the provision of employment, and to 
contribute to the development of the rural economy in the long run through 
strengthening rural infrastructure’ (Dev, 1995: 109). During the 1980s and 
1990s more than 100 million workdays were created each year through the 
scheme, which absorbed between 10 and 30% of total unemployed workdays 
(Dev, 1995: 113). Employment absorption through public works reached similar 
levels in the US during the Great Depression of the early 30s, with the 
employment of 4 million workers out of a total of 12 million unemployed (for a 
full discussion of the scale of US employment creation see Garraty, 1979). The 
performance of the Maharashtra and US programmes, highlight the limited 
achievements of the South African job creation programme to date. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Maharashtra state has a population of 80 million, roughly twice that of South Africa. 
 13
5.  The Employment Implications of Increased 
Expenditure on Job Creation  
 
Given the policy prominence recently afforded to increased expenditure on 
public works, the impact of increased expenditure on job creation performance 
is discussed below. As part of the expansion of the public works programme an 
allocation of R1.2billion over three years was initiated in 2003/4 for labour 
intensive infrastructure construction, under the Construction of Municipal 
Infrastructure Programme. Estimating the employment impact of such 
expenditure is problematic given the limited data available. However, indicative 
estimates of the employment impact have been modelled using three methods 
which draw on the evidence available; one based on current performance of the 
CBPWP, one based on a simulation using NEF performance norms from 1992 to 
1998, and one extrapolating from employment creation estimates developed by 
the construction industry.  
 
A crude estimate of the employment impact of this expenditure may be made by 
extrapolating from the performance of the CBPWP, which created 25,000 ‘jobs’, 
or approximately 3 million workdays in 2001/02 with a budget of R374 million. 
Assuming that job creation performance continues at current costs under the 
labour intensive allocation, the three year disbursement of R1.2bn between 
2003/4 and 2005/6 is likely to create an additional 25,000 temporary ‘jobs’ each 
year, or 3 million workdays per annum, totalling 9 million workdays over the 
three year period, and absorbing approximately 0.26% of unemployed workdays 
per annum. 
 
To model the impact of a R1.2bn allocation on employment in more detail, a 
simple simulation may be used, in which different scenarios can be simulated by 
altering the amount of workdays offered per ‘job’, and the material cost as a 
percentage of total cost. The wage has been set at R35 per day20, the distribution 
of costs between management, administration and workers has been taken from 
the NEF public works programme for the period 1992 to 199821, and it has been 
assumed that annual expenditure is phased incrementally (see appendices 1 to 4 
for the simulations). Under a full time scenario22 the total number of jobs for 
workers created per annum would rise to between 35,000 and 52,000 after three 
years, depending on material cost as a proportion of total cost23, representing the 
                                                 
20 R35 is taken as a typical public works daily wage, following Budlender 2002. 
21 The NEF costings are taken from the Department of Labour 1999. 
22 Assuming 22 workdays/month. 
23 The higher figure assumes only 10% of total expenditure being allocated to materials, as 
would be the case in rubbish collection, social work programmes (Adato et al, 1999) or in 
rural road maintenance programmes such as Zibambele in KwaZulu Natal (McCord, 2002), 
while the lower figure is based on the average material cost expenditure for a wide range of 
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creation of a total of between 19 and 28 million workdays over the period. 
Under a part time scenario, offering ten workdays per month, the figure would 
rise to between 69,000 and 103,000 thousand jobs per annum after three years, 
or a total employment creation over the period of between 17 and 25million 
workdays.24 Since the R1.2 billion is to be focussed in the construction sector, 
where material costs are significant, job creation levels at the lower end of this 
range are most likely, i.e. 35,000 full or 69,000 part time ‘jobs’ per annum by 
the end of the three year expenditure period, totalling approximately 18 million 
workdays. It is interesting to note that even the lower bounds of the employment 
creation estimates under this simulation are more positive than extrapolations 
based on existing CBPWP performance. However, the data on which both sets 
of figures are based are problematic, and these results can only provide 
indicative estimates of the level of employment likely to accrue from an 
expenditure of R1.2bn.  
 
The impact of R1.2bn allocation can also be assessed using job creation 
estimates developed within the construction sector for labour intensive 
construction. Job creation through increased labour intensity in the civil 
engineering sector was outlined in the National Public Works Programme (NEF, 
1994a), and was to be promoted through changed rules governing state 
expenditure on asset creation and maintenance. This approach has few 
international precedents and is significantly more ambitious than the project-
based approach, with the goal of ‘fundamentally changing the way in which 
publicly funded infrastructure is built so that employment and skills transfer are 
maximised for the unemployed’ (Phillips et al, 1995: 23).  
 
Formal economic modelling of the job creation impact of the labour 
intensification of the civil construction sector is required to assess the potential 
employment impact of this approach. This would require an analysis of line 
ministry construction budgets at all levels, to identify the proportion of 
expenditure eligible for labour intensification, and then an assessment of the 
degree of labour absorption likely to occur in each sub-sector if labour intensive 
methods were used using the employment ratios calculated by McCutcheon 
(2003). On this basis the potential employment gains from this level of 
investment could be modelled. This is a critical area for further work, as 
                                                                                                                                                        
public works projects as a percentage of total job creation expenditure under the NEF 
programme 1992-8, representing 40% of total expenditure (Department of Labour, 1999). 
24 The diminution in the total number of workdays created in the part time scenario is due to 
the fact that the management and supervision costs per worker in the simulation remain 
constant, whether a part of full time scenario is modelled, underestimating the cost of 
management in the case of the full time scenario, and overestimating it in the part time 
scenario. This problem is an artefact of the NEF public works data on which the simulation is 
based, as the NEF costings provided only mean management and administrative costs 
(Department of Labour, 1999). 
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significantly modifying existing capital/labour ratios within the civil engineering 
sector requires robust estimates of the employment gains likely to result, 
particularly in the light of the reluctance of the sector to implement significant 
shifts in factor intensity (Mabilo, 2003). 
 
In the absence of such detailed analysis it is possible to extrapolate from existing 
research by McCutcheon, Croswell and Taylor Parkins to gain a third indicative 
estimate of the potential job creation impact of a R1.2bn allocation.25 On the 
basis of labour intensive employment creation norms for the transport sector 
used by Croswell and McCutcheon (2001) it is possible to infer that the 
allocation of R1.2bn for labour intensive construction under the LICM would 
lead to the creation of up to 12,000 ‘jobs’ per annum over the three year period, 
although the duration of these jobs can not be stated. This would translate into 
between four and ten million workdays over three years, depending on full or 
part time nature of employment created. 
 
Hence the CBPWP extrapolation from existing performance suggests that a 
R1.2bn investment would create a total of nine million workdays over three 
years, construction industry estimates suggest between four and ten million 
workdays, and the simulation exercise, based on NEF cost ratios and current 
payment levels, 18 million workdays. On the basis of these three approaches, the 
annual employment created ranges from between 1.5 to 6 million workdays, 
which represents between 0.13% and 0.5% of total unemployed workdays. 
While this would confer employment opportunities for programme participants, 
the overall impact on the performance of the labour market, and unemployment 
in South Africa of a R1.2bn investment in labour intensive public works over 
three years would not be significant. The level of expenditure represented by an 
employment creation allocation of this order (approximately R400 million per 
annum) is less than 1% of the annual social security and welfare budget.26  
 
These findings question whether the expectations of proposed job creation 
programmes are realistic, in terms of reducing poverty, creating sustainable jobs, 
                                                 
25 The amount of employment generated by shifting government expenditure from capital to 
labour intensive methods has been subject to extensive technical analysis by McCutcheon, 
and others (see for example Phillips et al, 1995; McCutcheon 2001a and 2001b; Croswell 
and McCutcheon, 2001; McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins, 2003). McCutcheon argues that 
labour intensive methods of construction and maintenance have the potential to increase 
employment generated per unit of expenditure by between 300 and 700% in certain civil 
engineering sub sectors, such as rural road reconstruction and conveyances. He argues that 
this may be achieved without compromising cost, quality or time, conditional on adequate 
skills and institutional capacity development. Using this analysis Croswell and McCutcheon 
(2001) argue that for an annual expenditure of R15.2 billion in transport infrastructure 
460,000 jobs would be created using labour intensive methods. 
26 The 2004/5 social security and welfare budget is projected to be R46 billion (National 
Treasury, 2002). 
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improving training and stimulating economic growth, given the proposed level 
of investment. It is interesting to note that expenditure of R400 million per 
annum on employment creation represents 0.1% of total government 
expenditure, 27 while during the employment crisis of the early 1930s, 
expenditure on public works programmes rose to a maximum of 15.8% of 
government expenditure (Abedian & Standish, 1985: 75) through a range of 
large scale government schemes. 
 
 
6. The Fiscal Implications of ‘Extended’ 
Employment Creation 
 
While public works programmes to date have had limited impact in terms of 
reducing unemployment, current policy discussion is focusing on the role of 
‘extended’ public works as a key instrument to address unemployment and 
poverty in South Africa, as illustrated in the extract from the report on the July 
2003 Cabinet lekgotla below;  
 
‘Preparatory work has been done in identifying projects for an 
extended Public Works Programme, both as an instrument of 
poverty alleviation and a basis for skills development. This 
programme, cabinet said, is critical for the inclusion of a great 
number of South Africans – many of whom have little possibility 
for immediate absorption into the formal economy – in income-
generating activity from which they are also able to acquire 
skills’ (Report on the Cabinet lekgotla, July 2003, ANC Today). 
 
If an extended public works programme is to bring about ‘the inclusion of a 
great number of South Africans … in income generating activity from which 
they are also able to acquire skills’ it is pertinent to examine the fiscal 
implications of a programme large enough to include a significant number of 
participants. 
 
In order to estimate the cost to the fiscus of creating a given number of 
workdays, assumptions must be made regarding the unit cost of each workday 
created, and the percentage of the total cost allocated to low skilled wages. 
However these figures vary widely, as illustrated by the findings of Adato et al 
                                                 
27 Government expenditure is projected to total R334 billion in 2003/4 (National Treasury, 
2002). 
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(1999) in the case of the Western Cape.28 These are reproduced below in Figure 
2.  
 
Figure 2: Cost per workday and labour as a percentage of total cost for 
public works programmes in the Western Cape 1995 to 1997  
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 Source: Derived from Adato et al, 1999: 200 
 
The most efficient programmes, in terms of jobs created per unit of investment, 
with low cost per workday and a high percentage of total cost transferred as 
wages, fall in the upper left hand quadrant of Figure 2. The range of percentage 
of cost accruing to labour varied between 11%-22% for programmes relating to 
the creation of transport infrastructure, to almost 100% in the case of recreation 
ground maintenance, at a cost per workday which varied from R31 to R740.29 
These findings confirm analysis at a national level by the National Economic 
Forum (1994b) which found that simple projects and small scale agriculture 
related infrastructure entailed a 40-80% spend on labour, compared to spends of 
as little as 5-15% of total cost for water reticulation, storm water, sanitation, 
roads and railways projects (quoted in Adato et al 1999:  201). This indicates 
that the percentage of workday creation cost allocated to labour varies according 
to the capital intensity of the sector, and that the creation of socially desirable 
infrastructure may not necessarily entail maximum labour absorption, 
highlighting the potential trade off between the number of jobs created per unit 
spend, and the nature of the asset created.  
                                                 
28 Adato et al’s 1999 study included seven public works programmes and 101 individual 
projects in the Western Cape between 1995 and 1997, and is the most extensive study of 
public works programme performance in South Africa to date. 
29 These figures are actual costs, weighted by the amount of employment generated, not 
current prices, and are of significance in terms of their range, rather than their rand values. 
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For many public works programmes in South Africa however, data about the 
structure of employment created, the number of workdays created, and the wage 
level are not available30, and hence the proportion of programme cost allocated 
to wage transfer and management/materials cannot be calculated in this way. 
This makes analysis of the cost effectiveness of public works programmes and 
programme comparisons problematic.  
 
In the light of this the annual cost of creating full and part time employment for 
200,000 and 3,200,000 workers is modelled below, based on a series of 
assumptions regarding the wage rate and the percentage of total costs spent on 
wage labour, at a wage of R35 a day.31 The 200,000 scenario represents an 
expansion of current job creation performance, while the 3.2 million scenario 
updates the Taylor Commission estimate of the number of unemployed workers 
living in workerless households spending below R800 per month (Meth & Dias, 
2003), and represents a significant level of inclusion in line with the policy 
aspirations outlined above. The full time work model is based on twenty two 
working days/month, or 264 working days/annum, and represents a R770 
monthly wage transfer to participants. The part time model is based on ten 
working days/month, 120 working days/annum, a monthly transfer of R350. In 
both sets of calculations the estimates are bounded by a high (80%) and low 
(48%) share of expenditure to wages. The 80% figure is likely to occur in an 
efficient project with limited material costs (such as rubbish collection, social 
support or access road maintenance), while the 48% figure represents the 
average share of expenditure to wages under the National Economic Forum 
(NEF) public works programmes from 1992 to 1998 (Department of Labour, 
1999). 32  Table 4 summarises the budgetary implications of large scale job 
creation under the different scenarios outlined above, for 200,000 and 3.2 
million workers. 
 
The cost of creating full time employment for 200,000 workers (52.8 million 
workdays) for one year would range between R2.31 and R3.85bn, while for 3.2 
million workers (844.8 million workdays) it would be between R36.96 and 
R61.6bn at 2002/3 wage levels, depending on the percentage of total cost 
allocated to wage. The cost of creating part time employment for 200,000 
workers (24.0 million workdays) would range between R1.05 and R1.75bn, 
                                                 
30 Interview with de Bruyn, National Poverty Allocation, South African National Treasury, 
2002. 
31 R35 is a typical public works daily wage conforming to the mean wage offered under the 
Working for Water programme, (Budlender, 2002), and the KwaZulu Natal Department of 
Transport’s Zibambele programme wage (McCord, 2002). 
32  By comparison during the 1980s and early 1990s the average percentage of the 
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme paid as workers wages was 73% (Dev, 1995). 
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while for 3.2 million workers (384.0 million workdays) it would be between 
R16.80bn and R28.00bn.33 
 
Table 4: Cost to the fiscus of creating large-scale employment through 
project-based public works (at 2002 prices) 
 
 
Full time number 
of workdays 
(million) 
Cost 
(R billion)
Part time 
number of 
workdays 
Cost 
(R billion) 
200,000 jobs 
48% 
share to 
wages 
 
52.8 million 
 
R3.85bn 
 
24.0 million 
 
R1.75bn 
80% 
share to 
wages 
 
52.8 million 
 
R2.31bn 
 
24.0 million 
 
R1.05bn 
3,200,000 jobs 
48% 
share to 
wages 
 
844.8 million 
 
R61.60bn 
 
384.0 million 
 
R28.00bn 
80% 
share to 
wages 
 
844.8 million 
 
R36.96bn 
 
384.0 million 
 
R16.80bn 
 
Total annual unemployment in South Africa was 1.28bn or 2.09bn workdays in 
200234, depending on whether the official or expanded unemployment figures 
are used. By comparing the amount of workdays created under the scenarios 
outlined above to these unemployed workday totals it is possible to calculate the 
proportion of unemployment which would be absorbed, see Table 5 below. 
 
A part time public works programme for 3.2 million workers would absorb 18% 
of official, or 30% of broad unemployed workdays, at a cost of between R16.8 
and R28bn, depending on the cost structure of the jobs created. A full time 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that the lower cost bound is premised on the average percentage 
allocation to wage of a programme comprising a variety of project interventions. If a 
programme were to focus exclusively on one kind of project, for example labour intensive 
construction, the percentage of wage to total cost would be lower, and the costs of an 
extended programme commensurately higher. 
34  Calculated on the basis of 264 workdays or work per annum, multiplied by total 
unemployment. 
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programme would absorb 40% or 66% respectively, at a cost of between R36.96 
and R61.6bn.35 
 
Table 5: Large scale public works unemployment absorption capacity 
2002/3 (%) 
 
 
Number of 
unemployed 
(million) 
 
 
Total 
unemployed 
workdays 
(million) 
 
3.2m jobs 
(part time) 
workdays 
created 
(million) 
Percentage of 
unemployed 
workdays 
absorbed 
 
Cost 
range 
(R 
billion) 
Expanded 7.9 2,092.2 384.0 18% 16.8-28.0
Official 4.8 1,277.0 384.0 30% 16.8-28.0
   
3.2m jobs
(full time)
workdays 
created 
(million) 
  
Expanded 7.9 2,092.2 844.8 40% 36.96-61.60 
Official 4.8 1,277.0 844.8 66% 36.96-61.60 
 
 
Hence a large scale public works programme could theoretically have a 
significant impact on reducing unemployment, if a sufficiently large allocation 
from the fiscus were made. An allocation of between 5 to 8% of total 2003/4 
government expenditure would be required for the part time option, and between 
11-18% for the full time option, for 3.2 million workers. This level of 
expenditure compares to the 15.8% budget allocation to employment creation 
during the height of the unemployment crisis of the early 1930s (Abedian & 
Standish, 1986).36 It is important to note that the annual draw down on the fiscus 
to create this scale of employment represents a significant figure when 
compared to the social security and welfare budget allocation of approximately 
R46bn for 2004/5 (National Treasury, 2002). The draw down would be of a 
similar order to the net amount required for the provision of a universal basic 
income grant (Le Roux, 2002; Samson 2002), and hence give rise to the same 
                                                 
35 The inclusion of both the official and broad unemployment figures in this analysis does not 
imply any judgement regarding which sections of the unemployed should be targeted in 
public works programmes (e.g. the searching unemployed or the discouraged); the two 
figures have been used for indicative cost estimate purposes only. The issue of targeting is 
discussed in detail in section 8.4 below. 
36  The response to the problem of this depression focused almost exclusively on the 
provision of employment and relief for ‘Poor Whites’, estimated to number approximately 
300,000 (Standish & Abedian, 1986). 
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concerns regarding the potentially negative fiscal shock (see Bhorat, 2003 and 
Thurlow, 2002, for a discussion of these concerns).  
 
Regardless of the fiscal feasibility of such a programme however, these 
estimates are subject to serious institutional capacity constraints which could 
also undermine the feasibility of large scale employment creation, given the 
current limited performance levels of the CBPWP. These institutional 
constraints are discussed below. 
 
 
7. Institutional Constraints to Large Scale 
Employment Creation 
 
Success in the implementation of an expanded public works programme is 
conditional on overcoming three key institutional constraints: 
 
 Institutional capacity and project management skills at government and 
community and levels; 
 Incentives for provincial ministries to use labour intensive techniques, and 
also  
 Skills in the construction industry in labour intensive construction.  
 
Key institutional capacity constraints in the public sector and within 
communities comprise; lack of project management expertise, lack of norms for 
processes or procedures, inconsistencies between projects (wage, terms of 
employment etc), duplication of effort by different line ministries, lack of 
efficiencies of scale, lack of social development expertise, limited community 
participation, and the lack of credible Integrated Development Plans to guide 
strategic asset selection and promote departmental coordination. These problems 
may be characterised as the lack of a strategic or programme approach to public 
works, which results in a multiplicity of individual project based interventions. 
Given the scarcity of management capacity, this multiplicity of small projects is 
particularly inefficient, and constrains overall employment creation 
performance. This contributes to an inability to spend funds allocated to 
employment creation due to difficulties in identifying and implementing 
appropriate projects, and results in a sub-optimal outcome in terms of 
employment created per unit of expenditure. This problem is exacerbated by the 
short time scales of many projects, which entail high set up costs, (recruitment, 
training, development of procedures etc), and subsequently fail to realise the 
benefits of operating at the maximum efficient level.37 
                                                 
37 McCutcheon argues that overheads are high during the initial start up phase, but fall 
significantly once the programme is established, citing experience from the Kenya public 
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In the absence of credible incentives for the private sector to tender on a labour 
intensive basis, it is unlikely that major shifts in the factor intensity of 
infrastructure provision will occur. 38  Despite evidence presented by 
McCutcheon and others that labour intensive construction can be competitive 
with conventional capital intensive construction in selected sub-sectors (see for 
example McCutcheon & Taylor Parkins, 2003), a high degree of scepticism 
persists within the civil engineering sector regarding labour intensity. A recent 
study of stakeholder perspectives on labour intensification found that there was 
a reluctance to ‘alter an already optimal production function’ or to take what 
was perceived as a ‘backwards step’, promoting ‘ “enslavement” versus cheaper 
and more efficient alternatives’ (Mabilo, 2003: 17). Mabilo also notes that an 
industry stakeholder argues that construction ‘should not be seen as the means to 
employment creation, but an end, and that employment opportunities are 
generated by the provision of the infrastructure itself through the widening and 
deepening of capital within the region served by the road’, arguing that this 
effect ‘overshadows the opportunities created by the road building and 
maintenance activities’, assuming that the road as an asset will itself engender 
growth and employment. The stakeholder also recognises the complexity of 
intervention in the social development sphere, arguing that in a situation of 
‘extremely complex social fabric … allocations of employment… are subject to 
tacit rules that militate against the sustainability and of employment 
opportunities and other employment objectives’. This concern regarding the 
incorporation of a social development agenda into the construction work plan 
may represent an additional disincentive to increased labour intensification. 
 
One key reason for the scepticism within the industry is the lack of skills and 
experience in labour intensive construction. Despite initiatives such as the 
training carried out under the auspices of the Research Centre for Employment 
Creation in Construction 39 , the Limpopo Roads Authority’s Gundo Lashu 
programme which is explicitly focussed on developing consultant and contractor 
skills in labour intensive road construction, or the development of SETA-
accredited training in labour intensive techniques, skills in this area remain 
limited. McCutcheon and Taylor Parkins (2003) argue that if infrastructure 
provision is to be delivered efficiently using labour intensive methods, training 
in labour intensive construction is critical at all levels of management, from 
consultants to contractors, site supervisors and community liaison staff. The lack 
of skilled personnel in the sector is likely to cause a serious bottle-neck in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
works programme which suffered an initial 84:16 ratio of overheads to direct construction 
costs during its first three years (1974-76), which subsequently reversed to a 16:84 ratio.  
38 Mabilo (2003) highlights a credibility problem arising from the limited implementation of 
previous government procurement reform policies and incentives at various levels of 
government. 
39  This Research Centre functions within the University of the Witwatersrand School of 
Engineering. 
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expanded provision of employment through labour intensification of 
infrastructure provision, and possibly to undermine the quality and labour 
absorptive potential of this work. 
 
 
8. Microeconomic and Institutional 
Challenges to the Realisation of Policy 
Objectives 
 
As discussed above the assumption is frequently made that the execution of 
public works programmes will sui generis deliver the wide range of objectives 
set out in figure 1 above, encompassing employment creation, poverty 
reduction, asset creation and community empowerment, which may be viewed 
within the broad framework of the promoting livelihoods. However, 
achievement of these objectives is contingent on programme design, institutional 
capacity, and most importantly the addition of social development 
considerations to otherwise essentially technical or administratively conceived 
and executed projects. In this section the key policy choices and institutional 
factors that impact on the ability of public works programmes to attain these 
objectives are examined.  
 
 
8.1 The Livelihoods Impact of Public Works 
 
The sustainable poverty reduction component of public works may be 
conceptualised in terms of promoting the livelihoods of participants. Devereux 
has identified three routes for the transmission of a benefit from income transfer 
for improved livelihoods; the promotion of trade based, production based or 
labour based entitlements (2000: 3). Trade based entitlements promotion would 
occur through the purchase of food, production based through investment in 
food crop farming, and labour based entitlements through the use of income as 
working capital to increase profits from informal activities such as petty trading. 
The critical factor however, constraining achievements under these three sets of 
entitlements is the value of the income transferred, which is mediated through 
the wage rate and the duration of the transfer. Achievement of livelihoods 
benefits is also affected by to whom benefits are conferred, which is determined 
by the targeting and rationing of jobs created, by access to training and 
microfinance, and finally by the nature of the assets created. Each of these 
factors will be examined briefly below, and the main challenges identified.  
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8.2 Employment Duration  
 
In South Africa public works programmes, known as Special Public Works 
Programmes (SPWP), are defined as ‘a short-term, non-permanent, labour 
intensive programme initiated by government and funded, either fully or 
partially, from public resources to create a public asset’ (Department of Labour, 
2002a). Many programmes offer employment for between one and four months, 
and an explicit condition of the Special Public Works Programmes (SPWP) is 
that ‘no person may be employed for more than 24-months (sic) within a 5-year 
(sic.) cycle’ (Department of Labour, 2002b: 3). Hence the length of employment 
offered under a public works programme is legislatively controlled in order to 
provide as many people as possible with the opportunity to participate in the 
programme (ibid.), a tacit acknowledgement that demand for employment will 
exceed supply, and that rationing will be required. 
 
The duration of the employment offered however, is critical in terms of the 
ability of participation in a programme to have a sustained impact on poverty. 
By definition, short term employment will limit the total transfer received by a 
participant, typically in the case of a five week infrastructure rehabilitation 
project in the Western Cape the total transfer would be R1,22540, or in the case 
of three months of road construction employment in Limpopo R1,800 (McCord, 
forthcoming). This transfer will temporarily increase household income during 
the employment period, but is unlikely to have a significant poverty reduction 
impact sustained beyond this period, or affect the realisation of the entitlements 
which constitute improvements in livelihoods.41 This assertion is consistent with 
economic theory, which would suggest that a temporary income shock will not 
impact significantly on livelihoods and is corroborated by anecdotal evidence on 
the impact of public works programmes in South Africa, although empirical data 
on the relative impacts of short and longer term employment is not yet available.  
 
As important as the total amount of the income transfer generated by public 
works programmes, is the stabilisation effect of a transfer on the income of the 
poor, and the extent to which this enables consumption smoothing, reducing 
vulnerability to shocks. This stabilisation effect is contingent on the length of 
the period over which employment is offered, and is a consequence of sustained 
employment, provided either through a medium to long term public works 
programme, or through cyclical employment provision at times of minimum 
labour market demand. In the case of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
                                                 
40 This would be the typical remuneration for employment on a labour intensive infrastructure 
rehabilitation project, personal communication with D. Jooste, of the Provincial Administration 
of the Western Cape, January 2003. 
41 The exception to this would be a temporary in crease in trade based entitlements, relating 
to the purchase of food etc.  
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Scheme (MEGS) Dev has argued that it is the stabilisation effect rather than the 
immediate transfer which has the most significant impact on sustained poverty 
reduction, stating that ‘reducing fluctuations in income can be as important to 
the poor as raising average incomes’ and that ‘Reduction in income fluctuations 
can prevent acute distress to the poor and preclude the need for costly forms of 
adjustment, such as selling productive assets’ (1995: 126, 136). He goes on to 
assert that ‘even if the increase in income is not very large compared with the 
aggregate need, the existence of any form of income/employment insurance 
could be quite significant’. Evidence from the MEGS suggests that the insurance 
benefits that result from prolonged or guaranteed employment at times of 
insufficient labour market demand are significant to the poor, and Walker and 
Ryan (1990) argue that the risk benefit of a public works wage serves to increase 
and stabilise consumption expenditure across time, suggesting that this may do 
more to raise food consumption than efforts to enhance income per se.  
 
Hence the insurance function is as important as the amount of the transfer itself. 
However a public works programme can only have an insurance function if 
employment can be obtained easily, or is available on a sustained basis as an 
ongoing and regular income source. The concept of public works performing a 
social insurance function is problematic under South African conditions, given 
the structural and mass nature of unemployment 42 , which would lead to a 
blurring of the distinction between public works and a social grant (for a 
detailed discussion of this problem see Meth, Shipman & Naidoo, 1996). 
However, this insight regarding programme duration nonetheless offers a 
challenge to the legislative rationale and programme development norms in 
situations where programme duration is limited by legislation, as in South 
Africa. It also has implications for the importance of the seasonal provision of 
employment through public works programmes; if an intervention is to be short 
term, it should be counter cyclical in terms of local labour demand, in order to 
offer employment at the times when households are most vulnerable and hence 
maximise stabilisation benefits. 
 
The focus on part time asset maintenance, rather than creation, is one 
appropriate option for sustained employment creation, the other alternative 
being a ‘shelf’ of pre-planned projects identified at district level, which are 
implemented counter-cyclically on a continued basis if required, as labour 
demand fluctuates. This ‘shelf’ model forms the basis for the MEGS, but is 
                                                 
42 This is explained by Barr, ‘Private insurance requires, first, that the probability of the 
insured event for any individual is independent of that for anyone else. This condition is 
necessary because insurance depends on the existence in a given period of a predictable 
number of winners and losers. If, in the extreme, individual probabilities are completely 
linked, then if one person suffers a loss so does everyone else. Thus actuarial insurance can 
cope with individual shocks but not with common or systemic shock (1998 p114). 
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more complex to administer than a simpler part-time maintenance programme, 
and presupposes the prior selection of a raft of strategic asset creation projects at 
local level. The Zibambele labour intensive road maintenance programme in 
KwaZulu Natal, which currently employs 14,000 workers, is an example of a 
programme designed to provide a low level, but sustained income transfer (R350 
a month, on the basis of 8 days employment), offering the stabilisation benefits 
discussed above.43 
 
One other assumption underlying public works rhetoric in South Africa is that 
participation in a programme will offer experiential and formal training which 
will facilitate future absorption into the labour market. However, this supply 
side orientation does not take into consideration the limited demand for labour in 
the context of mass unemployment, and it is likely that the shorter the duration 
of employment, the less likely training or experience is to impact on future 
labour market success. With reference to the Western Cape, Adato and Haddad 
concede the tension between skills development and short term employment 
arguing that ‘given some projects last as little as three months and developing 
marketable skills take longer than this, there is a trade off that must be faced’ 
(2002: 28). 
 
Given the structural and hence chronic nature of unemployment in South Africa, 
and the continued inability of the labour market to create sustainable 
employment, many workers return to the unemployed labour pool after 
completing work in short term public works projects, rather than being absorbed 
into the labour market (Department of Water Affairs, 2003). The 
implementation of multiple short term projects may therefore serve only to 
churn the unemployed, replacing one cohort of the unemployed with another in 
short term employment projects, and removing them temporarily from the pool 
of unemployed labour, rather than addressing either the underlying problem of 
unemployment, or having a significant or sustained impact on livelihoods. Given 
the critical relationship between the duration of an income shock and its impact, 
it is unlikely that under short term project there will be a significant multiplier 
effect or stimulation of informal income generating activity (this is explored 
further in section 8.7 below). In this context prolonged public works schemes 
are needed that will offer sustained employment, in order to address the 
fundamental objective of poverty reduction.  
 
 
                                                 
43  See McCord (2002) for a more detailed analysis of the transfer efficacy and 
implementation of the Zibambele programme, implemented by the KwaZulu Natal 
Department of Transport. 
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8.3 Wage Level 
 
Together with the duration of employment, the wage level in a public works 
programme is critical in determining the use of the transfer received, and hence 
its impact on livelihoods. 
 
Devereux (2000) argues that the poor use incremental income to satisfy basic 
consumption needs first, then invest in human capital (education and health) and 
social capital, and only then to invest in income generating activities and seeds. 
In this way the public works wage only impacts on productive investment if it is 
large enough to cover consumption needs; ‘high value transfers are associated 
with higher propensities to invest in agriculture, social capital, (including in 
financial assistance to relatives), education and acquisition of productive assets’ 
(ibid.: 4). Low value transfers by contrast, are mainly consumed, in the form of 
food and clothes. 
 
Similar conclusions maybe drawn from recent evidence from Malawi, where 
investment in income generating activities using income from public works 
programmes ceased following drought related price rises. 44  This is also 
confirmed by evidence from recent surveys in Limpopo and KwaZulu Natal 
(McCord, forthcoming). Devereux summarises this analysis by arguing that 
whereas ‘tiny transfers have tiny impacts… moderate transfers can have major 
impacts’, (2000: 5) a finding also echoed by Dev in relation to the MEGS 
(1995).  
 
However, the payment of ‘moderate’ rather than ‘tiny’ transfers may imply the 
payment of a wage above the prevailing market wage. This can have three 
adverse effects. The first is the simple trade off between coverage and impact 
(this is discussed in detail in Devereux, 2000: 127); given a budget constraint, a 
higher wage implies fewer participants and greater rationing of employment 
opportunities. The second is the danger of distorting local labour markets if the 
wage offered is above the prevailing market wage, possibly attracting workers 
out of alternative employment and also creating expectations for levels of 
remuneration for future projects, (the tension arising from this problem is 
discussed with reference to the Western Cape in Adato et al, 1999).  
 
It is the third and related effect which is arguably the most important; wages 
perform a rationing function and must be set at or below the prevailing wage in 
order to ensure that self-targeting will occur and prevent the leakage of jobs to 
the non-poor. Devereux argues that if the wage is set above the prevailing wage 
                                                 
44 Interview with Malawi Social Fund public works programme participants in Lilongwe, by 
Sultan and McCord, June 2003. 
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there is a risk that ‘the desperately poor are excluded by those whose poverty is 
less severe’ (130), and he goes on to argue that depending on how the wage is 
set, public works programmes may be ‘seen as a lucrative employment 
opportunity by virtually all local residents’ rendering it difficult to select 
participants on the basis of genuine need. 
 
However, in the context of massive unemployment, demand for employment 
exceeds availability among the poor and non-poor alike (and among the more 
and less poor), and the rationing function of the public works wage is unlikely to 
be an adequate instrument for ensuring that work is targeted to the poorest, even 
if set at the prevailing wage. Hence setting the wage at the prevailing wage rate 
is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for reducing leakage under conditions 
of mass unemployment. There is a need for additional interventions to ensure a 
less crude form of rationing access to jobs. Using wage alone as a targeting 
mechanism risks either including the non-poorest, if set too high, or making a 
transfer which is of such limited value that it fails to address any but the most 
basic short term consumption (poverty alleviation) needs of participants, giving 
only a temporary boost to the trade based aspect of livelihoods, it set too low. 
 
Interestingly, research by McCutcheon (2003) on public works wage setting in 
two public works case studies, suggests that whether the public works wages are 
set at the minimum wage, as in the Zibambele programme in KwaZulu Natal, or 
below, on the basis of the exemptions negotiated under the terms of SPWP 
(Department of Labour, 2000b), as in the Gundo Lashu programme in Limpopo, 
both programmes are de facto providing wage rates which are in excess of the 
prevailing wage rates among the lowest deciles. Adato et al by contrast found 
that 79% of the projects in the Western Cape set wages below the comparable 
district wage (1999: 173). The implication of this finding is that there may be a 
need to develop location specific public works wage schedules, in order to offer 
public works wages which correspond to the prevailing wage. 
 
 
8.4 Targeting  
 
Women, youth and the disabled are the official targets for public works 
programmes, with the objective being the recruitment of 60% women, 20% 
youth aged between 18 to 25 years, and 2% disabled (Department of Labour, 
2002b). However, the social development discourse suggests that transfers 
received by women tend to deliver greater human and social capital benefits to 
households than those received by men. This supposition is supported with 
reference to South Africa by Duflo (1999), who found that the welfare impact of 
pensions received by women had a significantly greater impact on household 
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welfare than those received by men, and also by focus group discussions 
conducted among public works programme participants in Limpopo45 where 
female participants argued that public works wage transfers received by men 
(and youth) had a more limited impact on household welfare than those received 
by women (McCord, forthcoming). This challenges the limited participation 
target for women (60%), given the objective of the poverty reduction, and 
highlights the tension inherent in the multiple objectives ascribed to the South 
African public works programme. The explicit targeting of the disabled in the 
programme is also problematic in terms of economic efficiency, as the as the 
disabled are already eligible for a transfer under the existing social safety net. 
The double inclusion of one group within a social safety net which is already 
highly exclusive, in the context of severe job rationing may not be the most 
effective way to allocate scarce social protection resources.  
 
Some programmes have recognised these problems, and developed an 
alternative targeting protocol in response to the perceived incidence of poverty 
in their programme areas; the Zibambele programme in KwaZulu Natal 
explicitly prioritises female headed households, and more than 95% of its 
participants are women. At a national level however targeting remains a critical 
and unresolved issue given the massive excess demand for employment and 
transfers.46 
 
Targeting performance is also problematic, particularly in programmes in the 
civil engineering sector, which are technically focused and may have only 
limited capacity in terms of social development. Under these conditions there is 
a risk that targeting performance may be poor, with employment being offered 
to work-seekers, irrespective of their degree of social or economic 
impoverishment, or conformity with official targeting criteria (McCord, 
forthcoming). In the light of these problems it may be appropriate to replace the 
existing broad targeting criteria with alternatives which explicitly focus on 
poverty. 
                                                 
45 The reduced household welfare benefits accruing to households where youth and males 
were the public works programme participants was argued by female participants in the 
Gundo Lashu ILO/DFID funded Limpopo Roads Authority public works programme in during 
focus group discussions in Sekhukhune, Limpopo, McCord, April 2003.  
46 It is also important to note however that public works programmes by definition may 
exclude many of the poorest. Since households with limited labour resources are frequently 
among the poorest, and that the physically infirm or disabled are in many instances de facto 
excluded from participation in largely physical public works programmes, the appropriateness 
of public works as a primary safety net for the poor is open to question. The poorest 
households, especially female or child-headed households, may not have an adult who is 
able to work, particularly given the incidence of HIV/AIDS. These households are thereby 
excluded from the benefits of participation in public works programming. For this reason, 
among others, it is problematic to posit public works programmes as an alternative to social 
safety net responses to poverty in South Africa, such as a basic income grant. 
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8.5 Rationing 
 
As discussed above, the wage rate tends to be the primary mechanism for 
targeting in public works programmes, on the assumption that this will lead to 
effective self-targeting. However, rationing through wage-rate mediated self 
targeting is inadequate when there is excess demand for employment. Devereux 
argues that ‘self-targeting in Zambia’s cash for work programme was 
undermined by the massive scale of rural poverty (estimated at 86%)’ (2000: 3). 
Given the non-urban unemployment rate exceeds 50% in South Africa, and the 
probable existence of 3.4 million unemployed within the poorest three deciles 
(Meth, 2003), a similar scenario is highly likely in South Africa. 
 
Setting wages at or below market levels is then a necessary but not sufficient 
tool for the targeting of employment. Given the severe unemployment levels 
prevalent in South Africa, the self-targeting function of wage setting may not be 
adequate to ensure efficient rationing of the extremely limited number of jobs 
created in employment creation schemes. The assumption in the development of 
the South African public works programmes was that if ‘minimum earnings’ 
were offered, this would ‘ensure that jobs go to the poorest of the poor and are 
not ‘hi-jacked ‘by the not so-poor’ and that this would remove political pressure 
at the project level, (NEF Targeting Focus Group, 1994, quoted in Adato & 
Haddad, 2002: 22). However, the scale of unemployment has challenged these 
assumptions. Jobs represent a scarce resource, and without clear policy guidance 
on selection criteria or processes, evidence from the social development 
discourse suggests that it is likely that socio-economic power inequities or the 
existence of political divisions within communities may lead to the exclusion of 
the poorest from participation.  
 
Frequently a combination of lottery and community selection techniques are 
used to ration access to employment, often using criteria of unemployment and 
poverty (Adato & Haddad, 2002), although a recent survey indicated that based 
on these techniques up to 30% of the workers recruited by Working for Water 
(WFW) may have been drawn from the pool of employed rather than 
unemployed labour market participants (Department for Water Affairs, 2003). 
 
There is a need for both social development inputs and community participation 
to inform selection procedures if the ‘poorest’ are to be targeted as anticipated 
during the rationing process. The technical experts who are frequently 
responsible for the implementation of public works programmes are unlikely to 
be skilled in social development or facilitation, and may favour lottery methods 
or the allocation of employment on a first come first served basis. This is 
particularly likely when recruitment has been subcontracted to the private sector, 
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since community participation or the use of poverty or other eligibility criteria 
represent a cost, and demands skills which may not be readily available. If the 
community were uniformly poor then this method of employment would be 
appropriate, but given the differing depths of poverty experienced within 
communities and the objective of targeting the poorest, a more development-
oriented approach is required in order to reach ‘the poorest’ and reduce leakage.  
 
 
8.6 Training 
 
‘The empowerment of individuals and communities engaged in SPWP through 
the provision of training’ is one of the explicit objectives of the SPWP 
(Department of Labour, 2002). Under the conditions of the SPWP a minimum of 
2 days training should be provided for every 22 days worked, which should 
incorporate i) life, ii) functional and iii) entrepreneurship training, thereby 
promoting labour based entitlements and thereby enhancing the livelihood of 
participants.  
 
The impact of training however is contingent on market demand for skills, and 
also conditional on the ability of participants to fund job search, their mobility, 
and also access to capital, if the skills transferred are to be used for individual 
income generation activity. There is a need to design training in line with needs 
of different segments of the unemployed labour force; the training needs of 
youth differ from those of rural female household heads. The youth are likely to 
have many decades as labour market participants ahead of them, and the 
mobility to relocate in search of employment thereby increasing potential returns 
from skills based training, while for rural, non-mobile female household heads 
an identical training investment may be less productive (Bhorat, 2001).47  
 
The provision of training was negotiated in return for a relaxation of the 
minimum wage under the SPWP. However, the quality and appropriateness of 
the training offered, has in some cases been questioned by participants.48 While 
the provision of training is monitored in the CBPWP management and 
information system, its impact on future labour market performance of trainees 
is not routinely recorded, and preliminary case study research suggests that this 
impact may not be significant (Department for Water Affairs, 2003; McCord, 
forthcoming). Working for Water has suspended its exit programme due to the 
                                                 
47 For a more detailed discussion of the training aspect of public works programmes see 
Goldin 2003.  
48  Limpopo public works participants’ focus group discussion, McCord, April 2003. This 
dissatisfaction is increased by the fact that only 75% of the daily wage is received when 
participating in training under the SPWP. This can act as a disincentive to participate in 
training if it is perceived as unlikely to enhance future income streams. 
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realisation that the training (supply side) component of the programme is not 
sufficient to guarantee, or even significantly enhance the labour market 
performance of former Working for Water participants in the face of mass 
unemployment. 49  Likewise in their study of the Western Cape, Adato et al 
concluded that ‘The main constraint identified as to why workers and 
subcontractors could not get new jobs after the project was there were 
insufficient new job opportunities in the area’ (1999: xix). This questions the 
assumption which links public works employment to significantly enhanced 
subsequent employment performance. 
 
 
8.7 Microfinance  
 
The provision of training as one component of public works programming is 
problematic without simultaneous access to capital, through either savings or 
micro-credit facilities. This is particularly important if the low wage and short 
duration of the employment provided has not enabled participants to accumulate 
capital directly from wage earnings. Without the provision of capital for formal 
or informal income generating activity, the livelihoods impact of a training 
intervention is likely to be limited, as lack of access to capital is a major 
disincentive to self employment among public works participants. In a recent 
survey in Limpopo, public works participants cited lack of access to capital as 
the primary factor inhibiting informal income generating activity (McCord, 
forthcoming). This consideration is particularly important in the context of 
South Africa’s underdeveloped rural finance sector, and is likely to limit 
significantly the anticipated multiplier effects of public works investment at 
community level.  
 
Lack of access to capital restricts the benefit of public works programme 
participation to the transient, short term wage shock during the period of 
employment50, rather than promoting the exploitation of sustainable informal 
sector employment opportunities. Explicitly linking public works programmes 
to microfinance initiatives is one potential mechanism to surmount the capital 
deficit which is inhibiting the utilisation of the experience; training and 
entrepreneurial skills developed under public works programmes. 
 
 
                                                 
49 Personal communication with. Christo Marais, Scientific Service Manager, Working for 
Water, 13.8.03.  
50 For the long term unemployed, the receipt of wage income for a short period may be 
characterised as a positive income shock. 
 33
8.8 Assets  
 
The evidence base for assessing the economic benefits, in either micro or macro-
economic terms, of the assets created under public works programmes in South 
Africa is extremely limited. The CSIR’s research into the Tshitwe road-
upgrading project in Limpopo (Mashiri & Mahapa, 2002) offers anecdotal 
evidence of the potential for a disjuncture between the aspirations of a project, 
and its realisation in terms of the quality, appropriateness and strategic value of 
the assets created. Mashiri and Mahapa argue that despite the ambitious 
objectives of ‘increasing accessibility, reducing the cost of freight and passenger 
services and assisting agriculture by reducing the cost of inputs, boosting access 
to extension services and increasing farm-gate prices’ which are typical 
objectives within the public works sector, the anticipated multiplier effects were 
not realised. Money earned by workers did not circulate within the community 
and as the anticipated improvement in road passenger services did not 
materialize; neither did the benefits in terms of improved access to market and 
other amenities. Mashiri and Mahapa attribute the programme’s failure to the 
lack of genuine participation of local communities in selecting assets and 
priorities for the programme.51  
 
This analysis highlights a broader problem; if strategic and economically 
significant assets are to be created under the public works programme, asset 
identification needs to be part of a strategic selection process, involving both 
communities and local government.52 If assets are not identified strategically, on 
the basis of local inter departmental coordination and community preferences, it 
is likely that a proliferation of non-priority assets will be created, which may not 
deliver the intended social or economic benefits.53  
 
 
8.9 Accountability  
 
Public works programmes have the potential to promote local democracy 
through the participation of communities in resource allocation decision making, 
(in terms of both employment and investment in assets), and to promote 
                                                 
51 Mashiri and Mahapa argued that the community’s priorities of improved non-motorised 
transportation did not conform to the standard road construction model, and so were over-
ridden by the implementing authority. 
52  The recently introduced the district level Integrated Development Plan would be the 
appropriate institutional mechanism for this task. However, the development of these 
institutional instrument is a relatively new process, and they do not yet guarantee either 
community or integrated local government participation, or strategic prioritisation.  
53  For example, objective 1, ‘meeting the basic needs of the poor’, and objective 8, 
‘generating sustainable economic benefits’ are unlikely to be met unless assets are selected 
in this way. 
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democratic accountability by providing a structure for direct communication 
between local government and communities.54 An example of the potential of 
public works programme to promote democratic processes and give a voice to 
the poor is the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS). Under the 
MEGS, universal employment provision is guaranteed and the state has a legal 
obligation to provide employment as a right; ‘every adult person in the rural 
areas in Maharashtra shall have a right to work, that is, a right to get guaranteed 
employment’ (Maharashtra Planning Dept, 1981, cited in Dev, 1995: 109). By 
making employment an entitlement, the MEGS facilitate collective political 
action by the poor, and enhance the responsiveness of rural politicians to their 
needs (Eceverri-Gent, 1988, cited in Dev, 1995: 111).  
 
This illustrates the potential of public works to build community capacity, 
strengthen local government and strengthen community based institutions55, but 
this is contingent on the institutional context and the extent to which these issues 
are explicitly prioritised in programme design. There is a danger of constructing 
parallel structures to implement public works, due to an impatience to achieve 
results in the short term, which carries with it the risk of undermining both local 
democracy, and the institutional sustainability of programme interventions in the 
medium to long term (see for example the associated debate relating to the 
implementation of Social Funds). If public works programmes are integrated 
with local institutions there is the potential to improve the quality of the assets 
created and also to promote local democracy, accountability and hence 
confidence in the democratic process. However there is little basis on which to 
assess the performance of public works in South Africa to date in this regard. 
 
 
8.10 Management Information  
 
Existing public works programme monitoring and information systems offer 
little in terms of an evidence base against which to assess performance on the 
eleven objectives ascribed to public works in the current policy discourse. 
Monitoring tends to focus on the creation of ‘jobs’ per se, rather than the social 
and economic impact of those jobs (see Clegg, 2003, with reference to the 
CBPWP MIS). Also, the use of ‘jobs’ created as the central performance 
indicator, rather than workdays created renders analysis problematic, as does the 
lack of data on the duration of employment provided to participants.  
 
                                                 
54 The Zibambele Programme, implemented by the Department of Transport in KwaZulu 
Natal is an example of a public works programme designed to create jobs and also promote 
local democratic participation in this way. For a brief outline of this programme, see McCord 
(2002). 
55 See objectives 5, 6 and 7. 
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Where performance indicators are monitored, they tend be quantitative input 
measures (e.g. units of training delivered, kilometres of road constructed, or 
number of workers recruited), rather than impact indicators relating to the labour 
market, social or economic consequences of the intervention. A lack of baseline 
information on programme participants also renders impact analysis, in terms of 
the livelihoods of participants, problematic. A small number of detailed studies 
such as Adato et al’s research into public works programmes in the Western 
Cape (1999), and social research projects related to individual projects56 have 
been carried out. However there is little systematic monitoring of socio-
economic and social development indicators, and as a consequence there is 
extremely limited evidence on which to evaluate the impact of expenditure on 
public works.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
With the data currently available it is not possible to show that the anticipated 
broader benefits of public works programmes in terms of improved livelihoods, 
reduced poverty, the creation of sustainable employment, community 
empowerment, local multipliers, or growth as outlined in the policy rhetoric, 
have been achieved It is only possible to assess performance in terms of the 
scale of employment created, and by this criterion, success has been limited, 
with less than 0.5% of unemployed workdays absorbed annually through the 
CBPWP. If all public works programmes implemented nationally are taken into 
account, (including programmes implemented outside of the SPWP) the total 
annual employment created is not likely to exceed 1% of unemployed workdays 
programmes.57 
 
While additional allocations will increase the number of ‘jobs’ created under 
public works programmes, and the amount of workdays created, it cannot be 
assumed that this will lead to the attainment of the range of social development 
and economic objectives outlined in the current policy discourse. Nor can it be 
assumed that public works, as currently conceptualised, have the potential to 
play a major role in poverty and unemployment reduction. An expanded public 
works programme is unlikely to have a significant impact on the problems of 
poverty and labour market access, or their associate, growth, unless i) a 
substantially increased proportion of government expenditure is allocated to the 
                                                 
56 For example social research carried out by the KwaZulu Natal Department of Transport 
and University of Natal 2002 on the Zibambele Programme, and the Limpopo Provincial 
Road Authority and University of the Western Cape study of the social context for the Gundo 
Lashu road construction programme. 
57 This estimate is based on figures from the CBPWP, Working for Water, the KwaZulu Natal 
Zibambele programme, and SPWP data in Budlender (2002). 
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programme, ii) the series of policy questions highlighted in section 8 are 
resolved, and iii) the institutional constraints in both the public and private 
sectors are addressed. 
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Appendix 1 
Simulation model for public work programme/low cost construction 
employment estimates. 
Simulation 1:  Part time, material costs = 40% 
 
Total amount spent over three-year 
budget period (Rm) 
1200   
 Proportion spent in 1st year (%) 20   
 Proportion spent in 2nd year (%) 30   
 Proportion spent in 3rd year (%) 50   
 Monthly wages:   
 Workers 350   
 Supervisors 2500   
 Administrators 5000   
 Top managers 20000   
Workforce composition   
 Ratio of workers to supervisors 55   
 Ratio of workers to administrators 170   
 Ratio of workers to top managers 2000   
Material costs as proportion of total cost (%)   
 1st year 40   
 2nd year 40   
 3rd year 40   
Convert to standard worker equivalents Proportion   
 Standard worker 1 80.48   
 Supervisors 0.130 10.45   
 Administrators 0.084 6.76   
 Top managers 0.029 2.30   
Cost of employing standard worker 
(proportion of wage) 
1.242 100.00   
 Amount spent in 1st year (Rm) 240   
 Amount spent in 2nd year (Rm) 360   
 Amount spent in 3rd year (Rm) 600   
 Check 1200   
Amounts available for payment of wages (Rm)   
 1st year 144  3311363 
 2nd year 216  4967044 
 3rd year 360  8278406 
Numbers employed: Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total 
 1st year 27,595 502 162 14 28,273
 2nd year 41,392 753 243 21 42,409
 3rd year 68,987 1,254 406 34 70,681
Convert to work days (days per annum) Assumed number of days per annum: 120 
 Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total 
 1st year 3,311,363 60,207 19,479 1,656 3,392,703
 2nd year 4,967,044 90,310 29,218 2,484 5,089,055
 3rd year 8,278,406 150,516 48,697 4,139 8,481,758
 TOTAL 16,556,813   16,963,517
Check total wage expenditure (Rm)   
 1st year 115.9 15.1 9.7 3.3 144
 2nd year 173.8 22.6 14.6 5.0 216
 3rd year 289.7 37.6 24.3 8.3 360
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Appendix 2 
Simulation model for public work programme/low cost construction 
employment estimates. 
Simulation 2:  Part time, material costs = 10% 
 
Total amount spent over three-year budget 
period (Rm) 
1200   
 Proportion spent in 1st year (%) 20   
 Proportion spent in 2nd year (%) 30   
 Proportion spent in 3rd year (%) 50   
 Monthly wages:   
 Workers 350   
 Supervisors 2500   
 Administrators 5000   
 Top managers 20000   
Workforce composition   
 Ratio of workers to supervisors 55   
 Ratio of workers to administrators 170   
 Ratio of workers to top managers 2000   
Material costs as proportion of total cost (%)   
 1st year 10   
 2nd year 10   
 3rd year 10   
Convert to standard worker equivalents Proportion   
 Standard worker 1 80.48   
 Supervisors 0.130 10.45   
 Administrators 0.084 6.76   
 Top managers 0.029 2.30   
Cost of employing standard worker 
(proportion of wage) 
1.242 100.00   
 Amount spent in 1st year (Rm) 240   
 Amount spent in 2nd year (Rm) 360   
 Amount spent in 3rd year (Rm) 600   
 Check 1200   
Amounts available for payment of wages (Rm)   
 1st year 216   
 2nd year 324   
 3rd year 540   
Numbers employed: Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total
 1st year 41,392 753 243 21 42,409
 2nd year 62,088 1,129 365 31 63,613
 3rd year 103,480 1,881 609 52 106,022
       
Convert to work days (days per annum) Assumed number of days per annum: 120  
  Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total
 1st year 4,967,044 90,310 29,218 2,484 5,089,055
 2nd year 7,450,566 135,465 43,827 3,725 7,633,583
 3rd year 12,417,609 225,775 73,045 6,209 12,722,638
 TOTAL 24,835,219   25,445,275
Check total wage expenditure (Rm)      
 1st year 173.8 22.6 14.6 5.0 216
 2nd year 260.8 33.9 21.9 7.5 324
 3rd year 434.6 56.4 36.5 12.4 540
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Appendix 3 
Simulation model for public work programme/low cost construction 
employment estimates. 
Simulation 3:  Full time, material costs = 40% 
 
Total amount spent over three-year 
budget period (Rm) 
1200   
 Proportion spent in 1st year (%) 20   
 Proportion spent in 2nd year (%) 30   
 Proportion spent in 3rd year (%) 50   
 Monthly wages:   
 Workers  770   
 Supervisors 2500   
 Administrators 5000   
 Top managers 20000   
Workforce composition    
 Ratio of workers to supervisors 55   
 Ratio of workers to 
administrators 
170   
 Ratio of workers to top 
managers 
2000   
Material costs as proportion of total cost (%)   
 1st year  40   
 2nd year  40   
 3rd year  40   
Convert to standard worker equivalents Proportion   
 Standard worker 1 90.07   
 Supervisors 0.059 5.32   
 Administrators 0.038 3.44   
 Top managers 0.013 1.17   
Cost of employing standard worker 
(proportion of wage) 
1.110 100.00   
 Amount spent in 1st year (Rm) 240   
 Amount spent in 2nd year (Rm) 360   
 Amount spent in 3rd year (Rm) 600   
 Check  1200   
Amounts available for payment of wages (Rm)   
 1st year  144   
 2nd year  216   
 3rd year  360   
Numbers employed:  Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total 
 1st year  14,037 255 83 7 14,382
 2nd year  21,056 383 124 11 21,573
 3rd year  35,093 638 206 18 35,955
    
Convert to work days (days per 
annum) 
Assumed number of days per annum: 264 
  Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total 
 1st year  3,705,843 67,379 21,799 1,853 3,796,874
 2nd year  5,558,764 101,068 32,699 2,779 5,695,310
 3rd year  9,264,607 168,447 54,498 4,632 9,492,184
 TOTAL  18,529,213   18,984,368
Check total wage expenditure (Rm)   
 1st year  129.7 7.7 5.0 1.7 144
 2nd year  194.6 11.5 7.4 2.5 216
 3rd year  324.3 19.1 12.4 4.2 360
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Appendix 4 
Simulation model for public work programme/low cost construction 
employment estimates. 
Simulation 4:  Full time, material costs = 10% 
 
Total amount spent over three-year budget 
period (Rm) 
1200  
 Proportion spent in 1st year (%) 20  
 Proportion spent in 2nd year (%) 30  
 Proportion spent in 3rd year (%) 50  
 Monthly wages:  
 Workers 770  
 Supervisors 2500  
 Administrators 5000  
 Top managers 20000  
Workforce composition  
 Ratio of workers to supervisors 55  
 Ratio of workers to administrators 170  
 Ratio of workers to top managers 2000  
Material costs as proportion of total cost (%)  
 1st year 10  
 2nd year 10  
 3rd year 10  
Convert to standard worker equivalents Proportion  
 Standard worker 1 90.07  
 Supervisors 0.059 5.32  
 Administrators 0.038 3.44  
 Top managers 0.013 1.17  
Cost of employing standard worker 
(proportion of wage) 
1.110 100.00  
 Amount spent in 1st year (Rm) 240  
 Amount spent in 2nd year (Rm) 360  
 Amount spent in 3rd year (Rm) 600  
 Check 1200  
Amounts available for payment of wages (Rm)  
 1st year 216  
 2nd year 324  
 3rd year 540  
Numbers employed: Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total 
 1st year 21,056 383 124 11 21,573
 2nd year 31,584 574 186 16 32,360
 3rd year 52,640 957 310 26 53,933
Convert to work days (days per annum) Assumed number of days per annum: 264
  Workers Supervisors Administrators Top 
managers 
Total 
 1st year 5,558,764 101,068 32,699 2,779 5,695,310
 2nd year 8,338,146 151,603 49,048 4,169 8,542,966
 3rd year 13,896,910 252,671 81,747 6,948 14,238,276
 TOTAL 27,793,820  28,476,552
Check total wage expenditure (Rm)  
 1st year 194.6 11.5 7.4 2.5 216
 2nd year 291.8 17.2 11.1 3.8 324
 3rd year 486.4 28.7 18.6 6.3 540
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